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The Country of Origin Principle1 
and the Applicable Law for 
Obligations Related to the Benefit 
of Information Society Services2
The global nature of the Internet and the related ease of establishing 
international relations is conducive to the search for new conflict-of-law 
solutions. The need for users to take into account many national legal or-
ders, often divergent legal regulations (e.g. in the scope of the permitted 
private use of digitized works, competition law rules, consumer protec-
tion provisions), which involves the application of traditional conflict 
rules, promotes radical striving to simplify the rules governing the deter-
mination of the applicable law. This applies not only to the way of indi-
cating relevant substantive norms in the field of private law, but also to 
the scope of application of public law regulations (administrative, crimi-
nal or financial law). There’s no doubt that for entrepreneurs conducting 
international operations using computer networks, it would be beneficial 
to use only one legal system – preferably of the country where their 
headquarters are located – to assess all elements of their activity. This 
would greatly facilitate the estimation of risk associated with conduct-
ing online sales or providing i.s.s. On the other hand, the unconditional 
assumption of the right of the state of the seat of entrepreneurs could 
encourage them to transfer their headquarters to the areas of countries 
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non referred to in the literature as the race to bottom).3 When looking for 
new, universal conflict-of-law solutions for the network, one should also 
take into account the interests of consumers, persons authorized from 
intellectual property rights, as well as other entities that may be harmed 
as a result of actions taken by “online” entrepreneurs.
Taking into account these fundamentally divergent interests, at least 
in principle, serves the so-called c.o.o.p. (French: principe d’origine, 
German: Herkunftslandprinzip) introduced by art. 3 of the e-com-
merce directive.4 It’s a specific internal market clause of an innovative, 
conflict-of-law nature.
It is assumed that the Public Procurement Law established pursu-
ant to art. 3 d.e.c., is of fundamental importance for the development 
of international economic turnover carried out using electronic 
means of communication within the Community. However, there are 
serious doubts about the method and scope of its application. It un-
doubtedly covers the norms of public law of the country of establish-
ment of the service provider (e.g. regarding the registration of specific 
activities). However, the question arises whether it also concerns pri-
vate law standards (e.g. in the field of competition law). In the case 
of the Public Procurement Law, it also affected private-law relations, 
and the question arises as to whether it results from the requirement 
for Member States5 to establish a separate conflict-of-law rule.6 The 
impact of this rule on the indication of the law applicable to tort obli-
3 E. Łętowska, Europejskie prawo umów konsumenckich, Warszawa 2004, p. 254.
4 Directive 2000/31 from 8.6.00. on some legal aspects of the Act on commercial partner-
ships, in particular electronic commerce, Journal of Laws L 178, 17.7.00 (directive on elec-
tronic commerce, hereinafter: d.e.c.). Some other directives introduce, in the areas they reg-
ulate, a special type of “criminal law” (cf. Article 16 of the draft Directive on services in the 
internal market – Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the services in the internal market COM (2004) 2 final/3). In this study, the author uses 
this term in relation to art. 3 of e.c.d.
5 Hereinafter MS.
6 A. Thünken, Multi-State Advertising Over The Internet and the Private International Law 
of Unfair Competition, “International & Comparative Law Quarterly” 2008, vol. 51, is-
sue 4, p. 939.
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gations arising in connection with the provision of civil and commer-
cial law should also be determined (in particular, commitments from 
torts of unfair competition). At this point, it should be noted that, un-
like the other MSs, this principle was not regulated in the Polish Act 
on the provision of electronic services7, which implemented the pro-
visions of d.e.c. Only the justification of the draft law8 refers – more-
over, incorrectly – to the principle in question. The Polish legislation 
can be justified only by the fact the entry into force of the Act on the 
provision of electronic services took place before Poland’s accession 
to the EU. There is no doubt, however, that from 1 May 2004. the ob-
stacle to explicit regulation of the c.o.o.p. 3 in the Polish legal system 
has been removed. Paradoxically, therefore, it seems that the Polish 
legislator is currently in a more favorable situation, because, as part 
of agreeing the content of the discussed principle with the specif-
ics of the Polish legal system, it can take advantage of the experience 
of other IPs, which earlier introduced it into the internal legal order. 
No implementation of the c.o.o.p. to the Polish legal system, howev-
er, causes significant difficulties in practice, which is also associated 
with the problem of the direct effectiveness of conflict-of-law rules 
arising from directives.9 In the opinion of the author of this work, 
it is necessary to determine the impact of this principle on the method 
of indicating the applicable law. To this end, it will first be necessary 
to discuss the legal nature and origin of the principle, as well as the 
scope of its application, and then proceed to detailed conflict-of-law 
considerations.
7 Act of 18.7.02 on the provision of services by electronic means (Journal of Laws of 2002, 
no. 144, item 1204, as amended; hereinafter: the a.p.s.e.m.).
8 Print no. 409.
9 As for the last issue, see M. Szpunar, Normy kolizyjne a europejskie prawo wspól-
notowe, paper delivered at the conference “Dostosowanie polskiego prawa prywatnego 
międzynarodowego do standardów europejskich”, Katowice, October 1998. See also 
M. Szpunar, Prawo wspólnotowe przed organami krajowymi, “Rejent” 2004, no. 3–4.
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The Legal Nature of the C.O.O.P.
In the light of art. 3 of d.e.c., i.s.s. service10 is subject to the law of the 
Public Law in whose territory the seat of the service provider is located 
(c.o.o.p.). Two elements of this principle are the obligation imposed on 
the authorities of the country of establishment of the service provider to 
control its activities and the prohibition of discrimination against services 
(restrictions on their free movement)11 directed to the state of “receiving” 
services. The combination of both these elements, as is commonly ac-
cepted, implies the principle of the jurisdiction of the country of residence 
of the service provider for the assessment of the services provided by it.12
The country where the service provider conducts business (has its 
registered office) is obliged to ensure i.s.s. that they are rendered in ac-
cordance with the substantive provisions of that country as well as the 
relevant provisions of the Community law. For this purpose, the MS 
must control the service provider’s activities effectively and effectively. 
That is emphasized by the d.e.c preamble, which states that the supervi-
sion of the US aims to ensure effective protection of the public interest 
(par. 18). In turn, according to the official interpretation of art. 3 clause 2 
10 This expression in Polish law corresponds to the concept of “electronic services.” For the 
provision of electronic services, see X. Konarski, Komentarz do ustawy o świadczeniu 
usług drogą elektroniczną, Warszawa 2004, p. 13 and next; P. Litwiński in: Prawo Inter-
netu, ed. p. Podrecki, Warszawa 2004, p. 167 and next; Komentarz do ustawy o świadczeniu 
usług drogą elektroniczną, Warszawa 2004, p. 13 and next. It’s worth noting the wide scope 
of the definition of the concept adopted in the Polish Act, going beyond the traditionally 
understood concept of services.
11 According to the text from the website of the Office of the Committee for European Integra-
tion (art. 3):
1.  Each MS ensures that u.s.i. provided by the service provider established in its territory 
were in accordance with the national provisions applicable in this P.Cz. and falling within 
the coordinated field.
2.  MS cannot, for reasons falling within the scope of the coordinated field, restrict the free 
movement of u.s.i. originating in another Roman Catholic church.
3.  Par. 1 & 2 shall not apply to the areas specified in the Annex.
12 E. Łętowska states that “after fulfilling the conditions required by the law of the seat of the 
service provider, the supplier may act legally, and the applicable (material) law to assess his 
performance is the regime of his seat. C.o.o.p. is conducive to market opening and economic 
freedom.” E. Łętowska, Europejskie prawo umów konsumenckich, Warszawa 2004, p. 254.
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of d.e.c. made by the European Commission13, any form of restriction on 
the free movement of services, except for the exceptions strictly speci-
fied in the Annex to the Directive, is prohibited. The EC understands 
this limitation of all activities to be aimed at prohibiting the provision 
of a given type of services (e.g. a service enabling the ordering of OTC 
drugs on websites) or only limiting their availability (e.g. by prohibiting 
advertising of a given type of services). The Ratio legis of this principle 
lies in the belief that service providers who meet the legal requirements 
of one MS (where it is located their headquarters) should not be subject 
to additional bans and restrictions (e.g. in the field of competition law) 
in the country where their services are “picked up.”
The EC attaches great importance to this principle, as evidenced by 
the fact that despite intense criticism of the draft directive and discus-
sions lasting several months, the final wording of art. 3 clause 1 & 2 has 
remained essentially unchanged compared to the original EC draft.
The essential thing for the interpretation of c.o.o.p. is the interpreta-
tion of the service provider’s place of establishment.14 In accordance with 
art. 2 point c of the directive, the entrepreneur’s seat is located where the 
service provider conducts business, using a permanent enterprise estab-
lished for an indefinite period. Therefore, the seat means the place where 
the entrepreneur actually conducts their business, and not the place of 
registration or the place specified in the statute of the legal person as its 
seat. Therefore, it should be recognised that the directive adopts the the-
ory of actual residence, in a variation of the operating centre.15 As part 
of the location of the real seat of the entrepreneur, the directive rejects 
technical criteria, e.g. the location of technical devices, including serv-
13 Hereinafter: EC.
14 See L. Moerel, The Country-of-Origin Principle in the E-Commerce Directive: The Ex-
pected “One Stop Shop”?, in: Computer Technology Law Report, 2001, s. 185; D. Kot, 
Dyrektywa Unii Europejskiej o handlu elektronicznym i jej implikacje dla prawa cywilnego, 
KPP 2001, no. 1, pp. 52–53.
15 For the theory of headquarters in a variation of the operating center, see more broadly: 
W. Klyta, Łącznik siedziby w niemieckim międzynarodowym prawie spółek, KPP 1998, 
no. 2, pp. 249, 252.
164 | Adam Mickiewicz University Law Review
ers used for data transmission in computer networks. Recognition of the 
server’s location as the seat’s indicator would create the danger of pro-
viding services using servers located in countries with the most liberal 
regulations, which do not provide the recipients with due protection. 
Entrepreneurs positively assess c.o.o.p. because of their fear of applying 
a foreign law unknown to them being applied in the event of a dispute. 
On the other hand, as arguments against its adoption, the possibility 
of transferring the seats of entrepreneurs online to countries with more 
favorable provisions on business activity is raised.16 It should be noted, 
however, that in the event the service provider directs all or most of 
its activities to the territory of another MS, it exceptionally retains the 
right to take appropriate legal measures against the service provider 
(e.g. under competition law). This is determined by the case-law of the 
TEU17, to which, moreover, it refers directly to recital 57 of the direc-
tive. However, the abovementioned exception applies only if the seat 
of the service provider is chosen in order to circumvent the legislation 
that would normally apply, i.e. the country where the service provider 
directs all or most of its activities. The authors who omit the nuances 
of private international law18 in their studies are distinguished (on the 
level of Community law) by the so-called the principle of the coun-
try of reception (French: pays de réception/destination principe).19 This 
consists in accepting the jurisdiction of the place where the services are 
16 D. Kot, Dyrektywa Unii Europejskiej…, p. 53.
17 See ruling from 3.12.74 on Van Binsbergen, C-33/74 [1974] ECR -1299; orz. of 3.2.93 on 
Veronica, C-148/91 [1993] ECR I-487; orz. from 5.10.94 on TV10 S.A., C-23/93 [1994] 
ECR I-4795; judgment from 10.9.96 on KE v. Belgium, C-11/95 [1996] ECR I-4115. See 
D. Kot, in: Podejmowanie i prowadzenie działalności gospodarczej w Internecie, in: Handel 
elektroniczny. Problemy prawne, eds J. Barta, R. Markiewicz, Kraków 2004, p. 32.
18 Hereinafter: p.i.l.
19 J. Huet, Le droit applicable dans les réseaux numériques, Colloquium at the National As-
sembly 19–20 Nov 2001, Internet Law: European And International Approaches. The Im-
plementation Of Internet Laws. How To Resolve Cross-Border Disputes?, p. 5 and next; 
M. Fallon, J. Meeusen, Le commerce électronique, la directive 2000/31/CE et le droit in-
ternational privé, “Revue Critique De Droit International Privé” 2002, p. 480 and next; 
D. Kot, Dyrektywa Unii Europejskiej…, p. 53; D. Marino, D. Fontana, European Parlament 
and Council Directive on Electronic Commerce, CTLR 2000, p. 45.
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“picked up.”20 Depending on the type of legal relationship, this place 
is often identified with the place of: habitual residence of the recipient, 
performance of the contract or damage to the recipient. It is recognized 
that the use of a place is beneficial for entrepreneurs, and the application 
of the recipient country principle – for recipients (consumers, victims).21 
The criticism of contemporary conflict-of-law regulations, including the 
Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations of 
198022, as well as the draft Rome II Regulation of 200323, raised by 
business associations is based on the assumption that the applicable law 
indicated on their basis may be the law of the state of “receiving” ser-
vices. In the case of torts committed in connection with the provision of 
the Civil Code, as the law of the state of “receipt” can be understood, 
for example, as the law of the state of damage caused to the recipient 
(e.g. usually equated with the law of the state of its habitual residence).
The Treaty Sources of C.O.O.P.
According to the explanations of the EC, the purpose of the directive in-
troduced in the PPA Directive is to guarantee the application of – with re-
spect to i.s.s. – the basic principles of the internal market (French: marché 
20 The concept of the recipient country is also used in art. 49 TEC, which provision establishes 
the freedom to provide services (State of the Community […] of the person for whom the 
services are intended).
21 It can be reasonably argued that the party whose law governs the liability immediately gains 
a certain advantage over the contractor, which is not in accordance with the principle of 
maintaining an equal position of the parties in international trade. The national law of one 
side may be completely unknown or unfavorable to the other. See B. Fuchs, Statut kontrak-
towy a przepisy wymuszające swoje zastosowanie, Katowice 2003, pp. 39–40.
22 Consolidated version U. WE C027 from 26.1.98 The Polish text of the convention was 
published in PPHZ (1983), vol. 7, pp. 124 ff and in KPP’94, vol. 2, pp. 300–341 (transl. by 
W. Popiołek); PSM’84, vol. 4 and 6 (transl. by J. Poczobut). Poland acceded to the conven-
tion in April 2005. Its text has not yet been published in the OJ.
23 Especially of the basic conflict-of-law rule based on the link between the place of “direct” 
damage (Article 3 (1)). Project overview – Fabjańska M., M. Świerczyński, Ujednolicenie 
norm kolizyjnych dotyczących zobowiązań pozaumownych, KPP 2004, no. 3, p. 717 and 
next (together with the translation of the project).
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interieur) within the meaning of art. 14 of TUE, and in particular ensuring 
compliance by the MS with the principles of the freedom to provide ser-
vices referred to in art. 49–55 of the Treaty.24 This principle has its source 
in one of the four basic freedoms of the EC.25 With regard to the freedom 
to provide services, it is assumed that it does not require implementation 
in the internal regulations of the MS (at least until a derived law regulates 
the matter), just as other economic liberties do not require this.
Considering the development of the common market, the European 
Court of Justice26 has repeatedly confirmed the need to counteract any 
broadly understood restrictions on the provision of services in the terri-
tory of other MSs than the country of establishment of the service pro-
vider. Burdening service providers based in the territory of other MSs 
with additional legal requirements puts them in a state of legal disadvan-
tage compared to national service providers. As it has been repeatedly 
emphasized in the ECJ rulings, the introduction of specific advertising 
bans can also be a restriction on the free movement of goods or services. 
The purpose of d.h.e. is, among other things, the elimination of just 
such restrictions. However, it is worth noting that the use of services 
does not mean that this right will be more favorable to the entrepreneur 
than the right indicated, for example, by means of a market connector 
(in the case of acts of unfair competition). The C.o.o.p. is not intended 
to indicate the most favorable right for an entrepreneur. In accordance 
with art. 52 paragraph 1 of the Treaty, in order to ensure the liberaliza-
tion of a particular service, the Council shall adopt directives, acting 
by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the European Par-
24 See recital 22. More broadly: A. Cruquenaire, Ch. Lazarc, La clause de marché interieur: clef 
de voûte de la directive sur le commerce électronique, in: Le commerce électronique européen 
sur les rails ? Analyse et propositions de mise en oeuvre de la directive sur le commerce élec-
tronique, Bruxelles 2001, p. 44; E. Crabit, La directive sur le commerce, “Revue du droit de 
l’Union européenne : revue trimestrielle de droit européen” 2000, 4, p. 753 and next.
25 See more broadly F. Emmert, M. Morawiecki, Prawo europejskie, Warszawa–Wrocław 
2001, pp. 357–370.
26 Hereinafter: ECJ/CJEU.
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liament. On this basis, the freedom to provide services is reflected in the 
provisions of secondary Community law. One of the examples of in-
troducing a detailed principle of the country of origin on this basis is 
the regulation adopted in art. 2–2a of the Television Directive “without 
frontiers”27, in which the freedom to provide TV services is guaranteed 
by the application of the principle of the law of the state of the establish-
ment of the broadcaster. According to this principle, each MS is required 
to ensure that the TV programs in its area meet the conditions in the 
country of establishment of the broadcaster (art. 2). Other MSs should, in 
turn, ensure free access to the above-mentioned services and exclude all 
restrictions on broadcasting foreign TV programs (art. 2a). The content 
of art. 2–2a of the amended tv.w.f.d. was the prototype of art. 3 of d.e.c.
The doctrine did not prejudge the conflict-of-law nature of the rule 
resulting from tv.w.f.d.28 Undoubtedly, the application of the sender’s 
country principle adopted in tv.w.f.d. affects the coordination of pub-
lic law norms. However, the question is if it also affects the application 
of the p.i.l. standards. Proponents of this approach argue that since TV 
broadcasts should comply with the law of the broadcaster’s country, this 
also means taking into account the private law standards of that coun-
try.29 However, this is not a position commonly shared in the literature. 
It should be noted, however, that there are significant differences between 
the abovementioned directive and e.c.d. While the c.o.o.p. “mechanism” 
is well known in Community law (it is provided for in many directives), 
27 Council Directive of 3.10.89. on the coordination of certain laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the MS regarding the pursuit of television broadcast-
ing activities (the Television without Frontiers Directive, hereinafter: tv.w.f.d.; 89/552/
EC), OJ U. OJ L. 89.298.23 (amended by the EP and Council Directive of 30.6.97 
[97/36/EC], OJ L.1997.202.60, which significantly expanded the provisions relating to the 
c.o.o.p.). See more broadly: A. Cruquenaire, C. Lazarc, La clause de marché interieur…, 
pp. 43, 78–86; C.A. Jones, Television Without Frontiers, “Yearbook of European Law” 
2000, no. 19, pp. 299–325; B.J. Drijber, The Revised Television Without Frontiers Direc-
tive: Is it Fit for the Next Century?, “Common Market Law Review” 1999, pp. 87–122.
28 Otherwise A. Thünken, Multi-State Advertising Over The Internet…, pp. 939–940.
29 N. Dethloff, Europäisches Kollisionsrecht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs, Juristenzeitung 
2000, pp. 179–180; See also the considerations by B.J. Drijber regarding misleading adver-
tising in: The Revised Television Without Frontiers Directive…, p. 101.
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the scope of the principle expressed in e.c.d. prejudges its special, con-
flict-of-law nature.30 It should also be noted that tv.w.f.d. does not contain 
exceptions of a private law nature from the Public Procurement Law.
For a special way of treating c.o.o.p. resulting from e.c.d., note 
M. Wilderspin and X. Lewis.31 The authors argue this is related to a very 
broad definition of the coordinated field (formulé de manière extrêment 
large), to which the discussed principle applies.32
The Scope of Application of the C.O.O.P.
The literature indicates that the scope of application of d.e.c. is threefold33:
a) the Directive applies only to selected issues of e-commerce 
(general principles for the provision of services, disclosure of 
information on the conclusion of contracts in electronic form, 
liability of intermediaries in the provision of i s.s.)34;
b) the Directive excludes its application to a certain type of infor-
mation and services;
c) the Directive binds its scope of application to Directives 98/34 
and 98/4835, which define the terms u.s.i. and distance trading.36
30 A. Cruquenaire, C. Lazarc, La clause de marché interieur…, p. 44.
31 M. Wilderspin, X. Lewis, Les relations entre le droit communautaire et les règles de conflits 
de lois des États membres, RCDIP 2002, p. 299 and next.
32 In addition, it is worth noting that tv.w.f.d. it largely harmonizes public law substantive 
provisions of the MS on TV broadcasts, while e.c.d. harmonizes only five basic areas in 
the field of u.s.i. See L. Moerel, The Country-of-Origin Principle…, p. 184; A. Cruque-
naire, C. Lazarc, La clause de marché interieur…, p. 89.
33 See E. Łętowska, Europejskie prawo umów konsumenckich, Warszawa 2004, p. 250. Com-
pare D. Kot, Dyrektywa Unii Europejskiej…, p. 42 and next.
34 In particular, the Directive doesn’t regulate matters of copyright, “computer piracy” and 
data protection. See more broadly: D. Kot, Dyrektywa Unii Europejskiej…, pp. 48–49.
35 Directive 98/34 / EC of the EP and Council of 22.6.98 laying down procedures for the 
provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations (OJ EC L 204 
of 21.7.98) as amended by Directive 98/48/EC of the EP and Council of 20.7.98. (OJ EC 
L 217 of 25.8.98).
36 This requires interpretation of the terms d.h.e., taking into account the definitions adopted 
in the above directives, which is a significant source of ambiguity as to the scope of its ap-
plication – E. Łętowska, Europejskie prawo umów…, p. 250.
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However, c.o.o.p. has a wider range of application than d.e.c.37 It is 
not limited to areas regulated by e.c.d., but to all areas of law coordinat-
ed under Community law, as long as they relate to the provision of tax 
and civil liability
The scope of the coordinated field includes all the requirements that 
must be met to start a given activity (qualifications of the service pro-
vider, required licenses, procedures for notifying the relevant state au-
thorities) as well as requirements for the services themselves (codes 
of conduct, quality requirements, rules for advertising services, as well 
as liability for the provision of the service).38 However, the require-
ments for goods and services as such (e.g. labeling) or physical delivery 
are excluded from this scope.
C.O.O.P. in Light of D.A.M.S.39
In the literature on the subject, the predecessor of d.a.u.m. was Di-
rective 89/552/EEC.40 The heritage of the latter was consolidated by 
Directive 2007/65/EC amending it.41 Recital 7) in the preamble to that 
amending directive stated that the basic principles of the amended 
tv.w.f.d. ‘Proved their worth’ and that is why they should be retained. In 
turn, recital 33) of this preamble – in accordance with the codified 
37 See more broadly: O. Cachard, La régulation internationale du marché électronique, 
L.G.D.J, 2002, p. 104.
38 D. Kot, Dyrektywa Unii Europejskiej…, p. 47; O. Cachard, La régulation internationale…, 
p. 104.
39 Directive 2010/13 / EU of the EP and Council of 10.3.10. on the coordination of certain 
laws, regulations and admin. IF regarding the provision of audiovisual media services (Di-
rective on audiovisual media services; OJ L 95, 15.4.10, pp. 1–24).
40 Council Directive 89/552 / EEC of 3.10.89. on the coordination of certain laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Polish Partial Law, concerning the performance of tele-
vision broadcasting activities (Directive on Television without Frontiers; Official Journal 
L 298, 17/10/1989 p. 0023–030; no longer in force; hereinafter: tv.w.f.d).
41 Directive 2007/65 / EC of the EP and Council of 11.12.07. amending Council Directive 
89/552 / EEC concerning the coordination of certain laws, regulations and admin. IF re-
garding the performance of television broadcasting activities (Journal of Laws UE L from 
18.12.07 332/27).
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text – emphasized that c.o.o.p. is of key importance for the directive and 
should be applied to all audiovisual media services42 in order to guaran-
tee certainty for legal service providers and the free flow of broadcasts 
and information.
In tv.w.f.d. c.o.o.p. is expressed in art. 2. After the changes introduced 
by Directive 97/36/EC, this provision is imposed on each MS. The obli-
gation is to ensure that all TV broadcasts under their jurisdiction comply 
with the provisions applicable to broadcasts intended for universal recep-
tion in the relevant part. This general rule was supplemented by the res-
ervation in recital 14) that all dispatches, and especially those that are di-
rected for collection in another MS, should be in accordance with the law 
of the country of origin. This wording was formulated in the a.m.s. direc-
tive only in the context of the extended scope of application and as a re-
sult – a different conceptual grid, and despite the fact that the same c.o.o.p. 
was the subject of lively debate during the work on the directive.
C.o.o.p. complements the rule that only one MS may be the country 
of origin in a given situational and legal context. This means that a.m.s. 
may be subject to the jurisdiction of only one MS at a time. The practical 
implementation of this principle required determining, on the basis of the 
provisions of the directive, who the sender is and which country should 
be considered as the country of origin. Due to multiple doubts, regula-
tions related to the Public Procurement Law were essentially extended 
in Directive 97/36/EC, which amended Directive 89/552/EEC. This ap-
plies to both the introduction of the definition of the term “sender” and 
the transformation of the content of Article 2, and the extension of cri-
teria for determining the jurisdiction of a given state, adding Art. 2a 
and details of the derogation procedure. The introduced changes were 
to answer the problems with the implementation of the Public Procure-
ment Law, which were the subject of the CJEU’s case law. The con-
cept of “media service provider” was introduced to Directive a.u.m. 
instead of the concept of “broadcaster” and the criteria for determining 
42 Hereinafter: a.m.s.
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the jurisdiction of the MSs were based, on the main criterion of the seat 
in the MS (establishment) – with changes regarding satellite broadcasts.
The obligation of to ensure legal compliance – including in particu-
lar the minimal standards set by the directive – correlates with their obli-
gation to guarantee freedom of reception and the prohibition of restrict-
ing retransmission of a.m.s. originating from other MS from reasons that 
fall within the fields of coordination according to d.a.m.s.43 Permitted 
exceptions to this general rule are regulated there separately for linear44 
and non-linear45 services. In art. 4 d.a.m.s., several significant changes 
were also made compared to tv.w.f.d. These provisions supplement the 
regulation on the application of the Public Procurement Law in situa-
tions apparently involving the circumvention of the law. The problem 
is then created when service providers make use of the option to choose 
their country of residence and, as a result, are subject to the jurisdiction 
of the country of their choice in accordance with d.a.m.s., but at the 
same time direct all or most of their services to the area of another 
MS. The Rules from art. 4 d.a.m.s. are intended to facilitate the resolu-
tion of such problems and specify the principles arising from the case-
law paving the van Binsbergen case in the context of a.u.m. As a general 
rule, HF they may impose on suppliers under their jurisdiction the ob-
ligation to comply with stricter or more specific rules subject to coor-
dination – provided, of course, that these conditions comply with EU 
law. This provision expresses the idea of minimal harmonisation and 
establishing the possibility to create rules that go further but do not un-
reasonably restrict the treaty freedom to provide services. The regula-
tion contained in art. 4 clause 2–5 d.a.m.s. only applies to broadcasters, 
so it only applies to the provision of TV instead of on-demand services. 
In d.h.e. there is no analogous regulation. 
43 Art. 3 d.a.m.s.
44 Art. 3 ust. 2 d.a.m.s.
45 Art. 3 ust. 4 d.a.m.s.
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The problem could arise, for example, if the service provider is based 
in one MS, but it offer all of its services only in the territory of another 
MS, which introduces stricter standards for MSs (e.g. for the protection 
of minors). In these types of situations, consider the following arguments. 
First of all: are the requirements met at the minimum level specified by 
the directive? Secondly, to the extent that the solutions adopted in rela-
tion to broadcasters result from an earlier jurisprudence, one may won-
der whether excluding them from the scope of regulations on non-linear 
services would practically mean deliberate exclusion of applications re-
sulting from the jurisprudence applied by analogy. Combined analysis 
of recitals 40)–42) of the preamble of d.a.m.s. leads to the conclusion 
that, in accordance with the general principle, the right of the enterprise 
to choose a registered office in the MS is allowed, where it doesn’t offer 
its goods or services.46 And in relation to broadcasters, the necessity of 
cooperation between the countries concerned and the need for a more 
effective procedure for controlling the measures applied by the country 
in whose area the service is directed is clearly indicated. However, the 
question of whether a given broadcast is wholly or mainly directed to 
the territory of another country is considered generally in the context not 
of broadcasters, but media service providers. However, there is no fur-
ther reference to on-demand services. Thirdly, doubts arise in connec-
tion with the possibility of applying by analogy those provisions accord-
ing to which the EC may declare such measures to be incompatible with 
EU law, which would result in their inability to apply. This solution is 
considered the most important in the context of the changes introduced 
by the directive. The view was expressed that in order to make deci-
sions, the EC powers should be recognized in all cases of jurisdiction 
disputes, and not only in cases involving the circumvention of the law 
46 In this context, the following judgments were referred to in this preamble: C-56/96, VT4 
Ltd v. Vlaamse Gemeenschap, Rec. 1997, pp. I-3143, par. 22; C-212/97, Centros P. Erh-
vevs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, Rec. 1999, I-1459; C-11/95, Commission v. Kingdom of Bel-
gium, ECR 1996, pp. I-4115; C-14/96, Paul Denuit, Rec. 1997, pp. I-2785.
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of a given MS. Such a solution, although not explicitly provided for in 
d.a.m.s., turns out to be simply advisable from a practical point of view.
The draft submitted by the EC did not provide for changes to art. 4 
clause 2. This means this procedure still applies to linear services. How-
ever, as regards art. 2, it is suggested that paragraph 5b should be intro-
duced there, which would stipulate that in the event of an unresolved 
dispute between the Acts for whose jurisdiction a given case falls under, 
each of them may ask the EC for a decision, which in turn may then con-
sult the European group of regulators of audiovisual media services.47 
Such a provision may be a partial solution to the above problems.
C.O.O.P. in Light of D.E.C.48
In the context of the c.o.o.p., interesting relationships between the 
provisions of the directives can be seen: d.a.m.s., tv.w.f.d. and d.e.c. 
The preamble of the latter states that the objectives of its provisions 
are similar to those of tv.w.f.d., which in turn found some “continuation” 
in d.a.m.s. That is why d.e.c. can be considered lex generalis in rela-
tion to d.a.m.s. The provisions of both these directives aim to “ensure 
a high level of regulation” and, as in the case of broadcasting activi-
ties, they strive to fully implement the objectives of the internal market 
for the information society.49 So in a sense, solutions from tv.w.f.d. have 
become a model also for solutions from d.e.c.
Article 3 clause 1 of d.e.c. imposes on the MS the obligation to ensure 
that the i.s.s. provided by a supplier established in the territory of a given 
country are in accordance with the law of that country and the regulations 
included in its coordinated field. The MS cannot – for reasons related to 
the scope of the coordinated field – restrict the free movement of civil and 
47 Article 1 3 of the draft directive amending directive 2010/13/EU.
48 Directive 2000/31/EC of the EP and Council of 8.6.00 on certain legal aspects of the Act 
on civil law, in particular electronic commerce within the internal market (Directive on 
electronic commerce; OJ L 178, 17.7.00, pp. 1–16). Next: d.e.c.
49 Recital 4) of the preamble.
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legal entities from other MSs.50 Unlike d.a.m.s., the term “jurisdiction” 
is not used, but the concept of the service provider’s registered office is 
directly referred to.51 The criteria that make it possible to determine the 
state controlling the service provider are also complementary in the pre-
amble, and the provisions of the directive do not contain specific regula-
tions analogous to d.a.m.s. in relation to broadcasters.
The key concept for determining the scope of application of the c.o.o.p. 
to i.s.s. is the concept of a coordinated field. According to the inter-
pretation of the CJEU on eDate Advertising52, the mechanism established 
in mandates ensure that the service provider based in a given country 
complies with the substantive requirements in force in that country within 
the coordinated field. At the same time, the same mechanism, according 
to the same interpretation, prohibits host countries from restricting the free 
movement of services for reasons that fall within the coordinated field. 
The term “subject to coordination” is closely related to the concept of co-
ordination adopted in d.e.c., and is defined in its Article 2 lit. h). Pursuant 
to this provision, the fields subject to coordination were defined in general 
terms as the requirements laid down in the legal systems of MSs, which 
apply to the Act on civil law or to entities providing them, irrespective of 
whether they are general or specific. In accordance with the explanations 
contained in art. 2 lit. i), the coordinated field includes provisions regard-
ing both the setting up and pursuit of service activities. So they concern 
u.s.i. in a comprehensive manner, covering both the service provider and 
the service itself, including potentially all stages of its implementation. 
In fact, in order to answer the question of whether a particular regulation 
is covered by the concept of “coordination”, it is necessary to analyze the 
exclusions provided for in d.e.c.
In this context, it suffices to mention art. 3 clause 3, where it is indi-
cated that certain areas of the law were excluded, in accordance with the 
50 Art. 3 clause 2 d.e.c.
51 Art. 2 lit. c d.a.m.s.
52 Paragraphs 60 & 61 of the judgment in this case.
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annex to the directive. In turn, art. 3 clause 4 provides for the possibility 
of withdrawing from the Public Procurement Law in the enumerated 
cases of necessary protection: public order, public health, public safety 
and consumer protection. In these cases, when a given service violates 
or actually and seriously threatens to violate these goals, measures may 
be taken by c.o.o.p. only in relation to a specific service (therefore these 
exceptions are referred to as casu ad casum, or case by case) and in ac-
cordance with the principle of proportionality.53 The application of such 
measures is subject to the special procedure provided for in Article 3 
clause 4 lit. b). This procedure requires that the country of establish-
ment of the service provider be notified, and that the European Com-
mission54 be notified, before such steps are taken. In urgent cases, the 
obligation to notify may be fulfilled as soon as possible after the mea-
sures have been taken – together with the notification that this was the 
case. The EC has the competence to assess whether the measures taken 
comply with EU law. Based on notifications from the MS side, it was 
found the application of exceptions from art. 3 clause 4 rarely occurs in 
practice. In total, there were only 30 notifications in 10 years. In most of 
these cases, these measures were taken to protect consumers and none 
of them was officially declared by the EC to be incompatible55 with EU 
law. The reasons for such a surprisingly low number of notifications 
are not fully known. The EC Communication drew attention to some 
statistics – including notifications under Regulation 2006/200456 – in-
cluded in the Consumer Protection Network. These statistics concerned 
the failure by service providers to fulfill some of the obligations set out 
in d.a.m.s., where the decline in notifications pursuant to Art. 3 clause 4 
53 See e.g. the judgment of the CJEU on C-108/09, Ker-Optika v ÀNTSZ Dél-dunántúli Re-
gionális Intézete, ECR 2010, pp. I-12213, par. 76.
54 Hereinafter: EC.
55 Commision Staff Working Document Online Services, including e-commerce, in the Single 
Market, p. 21.
56 Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 of the EP and Council of 27.10.04 on cooperation between 
national authorities responsible for enforcing consumer protection legislation (Regulation 
on cooperation in consumer protection; OJ L 364 of 9.12.04, p. 1, as amended).
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lit. b) corresponds to the increase in notifications under the Regulation. 
This factor, however, is not considered to be a full and satisfactory ex-
planation of such a low number of notifications.
Relationships Between the Provisions 
of D.A.M.S. and D.E.C. in the Context 
of A.M.S. on Demand
The relationship between the two directives is laid down in Article 4 
clause 8 d.a.m.s. The principle introduced there stipulates that d.e.c. is 
generally applicable unless d.a.m.s. provides otherwise, and in the event 
of a collision between them d.a.m.s. takes precedence. This principle 
has yet to be corrected by the fact that, from the scope of the subject 
d.e.c., TV broadcasting services which fall under the scope of Directive 
89/552/EEC are expressly excluded. This rule in relation to the Public 
Procurement Law can be interpreted in such a way that in the fields 
covered by the coordination in d.a.m.s. and in the absence of a different 
provision, the provisions of this directive apply – also when exceptions 
to the c.o.o.p. are permissible. The case is different in terms of other re-
quirements that are imposed on service providers and which fall within 
the term “coordinated field” in the spirit of art. 2 lit. h d.e.c. There – ac-
cording to the judgment in the eDating Service case – the obligation of 
the UE member states is to ensure that the service provider does not stay 
subject to more stringent regulations than those in force in the substan-
tive law of the country of its seat. All exceptions to this rule are permis-
sible only in situations provided for in the art. 3 clause 4 directives.
In d.a.m.s., c.o.o.p. is to oblige MSs to guarantee the greatest pos-
sible freedom of reception and retransmission of a.m.s. from other EU 
member states. In the context of the definition of the term “supplier 
a.m.s.” and the criteria for choosing the jurisdiction of a given MS, it 
can be seen that in d.a.m.s. these issues have been further detailed, 
in contrast to the general categories of d.h.e. The term “supplier a.m.s.” 
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was clarified primarily thanks to the criterion of editorial responsibility. 
This is intended to provide an answer to the question of who provides 
a specific media service on demand. One also has to agree with the di-
agnosis that the detailed directions contained in art. 2 clause 2 and 3 are 
used to precisely determine the seat of the service provider, while d.e.c. 
only provides guidance on determining the country of such residence. 
Therefore, the solutions of a.m.s. are much more detailed.
Uniform criteria for both linear and non-linear services have been 
adopted as to the determination of the service provider and the coun-
try of the relevant jurisdiction. It is significant that these criteria have 
not been changed in the context of the on-demand services referred to 
in art. 2 clause 4 d.a.u.m. Acceptable exceptions are regulated here. 
There is a great deal of talk about circumvention when it comes to 
TV broadcasting. In this discourse, certain solutions were developed, 
which, however, ultimately did not include on-demand services (see Ar-
ticle 4(2) of d.a.u.m.). The Reasons for not using the PP for non-linear 
services are the same as those included in d.h.e. The justification for 
this solution is not fully understood. It is also necessary to take into 
account the fact that the scope and actual effects of the application of 
d.a.u.m. they depend primarily on two factors: the field of coordinated 
fields and the scope of permissible exceptions. What’s more, mutual re-
lations between these two aspects of the PPP are extremely important. 
This means that the possibility of exceptions should be correlated with 
the scope of the coordinated domains. In favor of such a solution, there 
is a logical argument that if the principle of freedom of receipt of goods 
or flow of services is introduced in certain indicated areas, then it is 
necessary to consider in what types of situations there may be a need to 
introduce restrictions due to the protection of overriding interests. In the 
context of coordinated fields, a two-level scope of regulations was in-
troduced – separate for linear and non-linear services. In practice, this 
means justification – at least to some extent – of the introduction of 
different exceptions for these two categories of media services. But do 
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these exceptions have to be identical to those provided in d.e.c.? On the 
one hand, another aspect of coordinated fields can be seen here. On the 
other hand, however, the adoption of exceptions from this last directive 
could only be dictated by the abovementioned relationship between this 
directive as a general law (lex generalis) and d.a.m.s. as a special law 
(lex specialis) in the field of non-linear services. In this respect, solu-
tions from d.a.u.m. could be a supplement to the solutions from d.e.c., 
but at the same time remaining within the limits set in the latter.
However, such an argument is not entirely convincing, for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, in both directives on the c.o.o.p. are expressed 
slightly differently. D.a.m.s. insists on the unlimited nature of receiving 
and using audiovisual services on demand, while d.h.e. it is limited to 
imposing general restrictions on the provision of services. Secondly, it 
seems that the legal structure introduced here is based on technologi-
cal criteria, and non-linear services are regulated in accordance with 
the model provided for all laws and regulations. The characterization 
of these services as consisting in the provision of audiovisual broadcasts, 
as well as the scope of coordinated fields, which is different in both these 
Directives, can be attributed to the background. Meanwhile, the basics 
for introducing restrictions should be introduced with analogy to the 
regulations on the distribution of TV instead of the broadly defined law.
Another extremely important issue in the relationship between the 
two directives is the legal framework for the potential requirement to ob-
tain authorization to operate a given type. Article 4 1 d.e.c. requires MSs 
to ensure that undertaking and conducting activity in the scope of pro-
viding us with goods and services do not require authorization or mea-
sures with a similar effect. Recital 19) in the preamble to d.a.m.s., on the 
other hand, expresses the assumption that this directive does not affect 
the liability of and their bodies in the field of organizational activities, 
including licensing systems and administrative permits. On the other 
hand, recital 20 of this preamble indicates that no provision of the direc-
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tive should oblige or encourage MSs to introduce new concession sys-
tems and administrative approvals in relation to a.m.s. in any category.
The formulation of the provisions of both directives reveals some in-
compatibilities between them. It can be concluded here that d.a.m.s. al-
lows the introduction of, for example, a system of authorizations for the 
provision of non-linear audiovisual services, which is definitely incom-
patible with Article 4 clause 1 of d.e.c. However, it can be argued these 
issues are outside the scope of the subject of d.a.m.s., and the indicated 
recitals cannot be treated as provisions that would establish exceptions 
to the general rule expressed in art. 4 clause 1 d.e.c. Due to the relation-
ship between the provisions of both Directives, there is a fundamental 
difference in the authorization system for the provision of linear and 
non-linear services. Potential further doubts should be resolved in the 
light of art. 11 par. 2 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights57, whose 
provision expresses the principle of respect for the freedom of the me-
dia and the acquis in the field of the application of freedom of expres-
sion and the admissibility of exceptions thereto.
The Country of Origin Principle and the Applicable 
Law for Obligations Related to the Benefit 
of Information Society Services – the Abstract
The article deals with the issue of the titular country of origin principle 
as one of the crucial institutions of the legal system of the European 
Union – in this case within the context of information society services, 
especially of audiovisual media services (also on demand). The princi-
ple in question is one of the basic rules which constitute the fundaments 
for the economic system of the European Union – especially where the 
context of its internal market is concerned. The article considers the gen-
esis, history and evolution of this principle in order to give a generalized 
comprehension of why it is currently shaped and programmed to func-
57 Official Journal of the European Union, C 326, 26 October 2012.
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tion in such a way and not otherwise. The main points of references here 
are of course various acts of European Union law. Of this material, the 
most important acts of law are: 
 – Directive 2000 / 31 from 8th June 2000 on some legal aspects 
of the Act on commercial partnerships, in particular electronic 
commerce (Journal of Laws L 178, 17th July 2000, colloquially: 
directive on electronic commerce); 
 – Directive of the Council of 3rd October 1989 on the coordina-
tion of certain laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
of the Member States regarding the pursuit of television broad-
casting activities (colloquially: Television without Frontiers 
Directive, 89 / 552 / EC, OJ U. OJ L. 89.298.23, amended by 
the EP and Council Directive of 30th June 1997 [97 / 36 / EC], 
OJ L.1997.202.60, which significantly expanded the provisions 
relating to the principle in question);
 – Directive 98 / 34 / EC of the EP and Council of 22nd July 1998 
laying down procedures for the provision of information in the 
field of technical standards and regulations (OJ EC L 204 of 
21.7.98) as amended by Directive 98 / 48 / EC of the EP and 
Council of 20th July 1998. (OJ EC L 217 of 25.8.98);
 – Directive 2010 / 13 / EU of the EP and Council of 10th March 
2010 on the coordination of certain laws, regulations and admin-
istrative issues regarding the provision of audiovisual media ser-
vices (OJ L 95, 15th April 2010, pp. 1–24, colloquially: Directive 
on audiovisual media services);
 – Consolidated version of the Treaty on the functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union (Official Journal of the European Union, C 326/49)
 – Regulation (EC) No. 2006 / 2004 of the EP and Council of 
27th November 2004 on cooperation between national authori-
ties responsible for enforcing consumer protection legislation 
(OJ L 364 of 9th December 2004, p. 1, as amended; colloquially: 
Regulation on cooperation in consumer protection);
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 – Directive 2007 / 65 / EC of the EP and Council of 11th December 
2007. amending Council Directive 89 / 552 / EEC concerning the 
coordination of certain laws, regulations and admin. issues re-
garding the performance of television broadcasting activities 
(Journal of Laws UE L from 18th December 2007, 332 / 27);
 – and last but not least EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Journal 
of Laws of C 326 from 26th November 2012, pp. 391–407).
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SUMMARY
The Country of Origin Principle  
and the Applicable Law for Obligations Related 
to the Benefit of Information Society Services
The article takes all of the abovementioned legacy of European Union Law 
into consideration while analysing them in depth through the prism of the 
principle in question and via careful comparisons of each of them as well. 
Particular attention is paid to the following issues, namely: the legal na-
ture of the principle in question, its treaty sources, its scope of application, 
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the principle in question in the light of the abovementioned directives – 
namely the Directive on audiovisual media services and the Directive on 
electronic commerce; and finally – relationships between provisions of 
the two aforementioned directives in the context of audiovisual media ser-
vices on demand. While working on the text, all of the mentioned parts 
of the main subject turned out to be important enough to put them into 
separated sections of the text with their own individual headings. In the 
meantime, several interesting subject-related sentences by the European 
Court of Justice were also taken into account for a broadened pool of 
reference. To sum it all up: ultimately, the principle in question and its 
potential influence on the practical functioning of the European Union’s 
law and economy has been considered thoroughly.
Keywords: country of origin principle, European  Union law, informa-
tion society services, audiovisual media services, services on demand, 
electronic commerce, UE directives, ECJ judgments, television “with-
out frontiers”, amendments.
Mateusz Kotkowski, Faculty of Law, Koźmiński University, Jagiellońska 
57/59, 03–301 Warsaw, Republic of Poland, e-mail: 
DOI 10.14746/ppuam.2020.11.09

